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Abstract 
 
Exporter wage premium has been widely studied in the literature on international trade. 
The aim of this paper is analyze whether there is also a producer quality wage premium 
at firm level, and if so, analyze whether its origin is similar to the exporter wage 
premium. In other words, I test whether firms that increase their product quality become 
more productive and pay higher wages (as with the learning by exporting hypothesis, 
we can speak of learning by producing quality), or, in contrast, more-productive firms 
with higher wages opt to increase product quality because their higher productivity 
means these kinds of decisions and investments can be taken with more guarantees 
(self-selection hypothesis). 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the pioneering paper by Bernard and Jensen (1995) many papers on exporter 
wage premium have appeared. Wagner (2007, 2012) and Schank et al. (2010) mention 
most of them and summarize their contributions. The main motivation of this paper 
stems from Alcalá and Hernández (2010), where we build a theoretical model that 
suggests that wage premium of exporter firms and their higher human capital are due to 
their higher product quality. More-productive firms can overcome entry costs in 
international markets (although also national ones1) and they produce higher quality 
goods. This relation also generates a rise in human capital and in the average wage of 
the firm. However, the relation between wages and product quality could not be 
contrasted because the dataset used in this paper had no information about quality 
product. Therefore, this paper attempts to mitigate this shortcoming by analyzing the 
correlations between the quality of the product, the exports and the average wages of the 
firm. 
 
 There are several papers that have analyzed empirical positive correlations 
between exports, quality and productivity and wages in firms or establishments. 
Verhoogen (2008) finds that more-productive establishments produce higher-quality 
goods than less-productive establishments, and they pay higher wages to maintain a 
higher-quality workforce. In many cases, the arguments for this empirical relation are 
based on the literature on firm-size wage premium (Idson and Oi, 1999) and exporter 
wage premium (Bernard and Jensen, 1995). Kugler and Verhoogen (2011) use a 
measure of the scope for quality differentiation from Sutton (1998) and find that the 
output price-plant size and input price-plant size elasticities are greater in sectors with 
more scope for quality differentiation. Verhoogen (2008) finds that more-productive 
plants increase the export share of sales, wages and the likelihood of ISO 9000 
certification more than less-productive plants. Guadalupe (2007) argues that increased 
product market competition leads to higher returns to skill, because high-skilled 
workers produce at lower costs, and there is stronger competition between firms to 
attract better workers. A similar point of view is taken by Bustos (2011), who finds that 
                                                 
1 Similar effects are obtained between establishments in national-market versus local-market. 
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trade liberalization induces the most productive firms, usually exporters, to adopt skill-
intensive production technologies2. 
 
 Most of these papers suppose that firms that increase their product quality 
become more productive and pay higher wages, similar to the learning-by-exporting 
hypothesis for exporter firms. However, the causal relation could also be the opposite. 
Higher productivity in exporting firms is due to self-selection of more productive firms 
in export markets (self-selection hypothesis). This may also be applicable to firms that 
increase their product quality. More-productive firms with higher wages decide to 
increase product quality because their higher productivity means these kinds of 
decisions and investments can be taken with more guarantees.  
 
 There is a wealth of literature on which hypothesis is more relevant - learning-
by-exporting or self-selection - in the case of exporter firms. Singh (2010) concludes 
that, at firm level, the studies supporting self-selection clearly outnumber the studies 
supporting learning-by-exporting. But, in the case of relations between product quality 
and productivity or wages, there are no studies which analyze their causality. Therefore, 
this paper has two aims: i) to ascertain whether a producer quality wage premium exists, 
and ii) to analyze whether firms that increase their product quality become more 
productive and pay higher wages (learning-by-producing-quality hypothesis), or, in 
contrast, more-productive firms with higher wages decide to increase their product 
quality (self-selection hypothesis).  
 
 To carry out the second of these aims I use the methodology proposed by 
Schank et al. (2010) in the context of exporter firms. These authors contrast the 
learning-by-exporting versus self-selection hypothesis using a dataset of German linked 
employer-employee and obtain empirical evidence for the latter. Papers that focus on 
the relation between firm heterogeneity and exports (Melitz, 2003 and Greenaway and 
Kneller, 2007) are the theoretical basis of this result. I also contrast these hypotheses 
with Spanish data. There are several papers which have analyzed this question in Spain, 
paying attention to the estimated total factor productivity. Delgado et al. (2003) obtain 
evidence in favour of the self-selection hypothesis, but Mañez et al. (2010) find 
                                                 
2 Bernard et al. (2011) review this empirical evidence on firm heterogeneity in international trade. 
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evidence in favour of the learning-by-exporting hypothesis. Manjón et al. (2012) 
indicate that the assumptions used about the evolution of productivity and the role of 
export status turns out to be critical in finding evidence in favour of either hypothesis. 
The advantage of using an observed variable, such as wages, instead of estimated 
productivity to contrast these hypotheses is that we do not need to impose additional 
assumptions. 
 
The Spanish dataset used to analyze the effect of product quality on wages is the 
Encuesta Sobre Estrategias Empresariales (Survey on Companies’ Strategies, 
hereinafter, ESEE). With this dataset, I will use the measure for quality from Sutton (the 
R&D and advertising intensity) and information from a categorical variable which 
indicates whether the firm has carried out or contracted quality standardization and 
control works, because the dataset does not contain information about ISO certification. 
I will analyze whether the correlations of theses measures for quality with other 
variables are as expected. Subsequently, I estimate demand equations for skill workers 
and wages equations adding these measures for quality in order to contrast whether 
product quality generates the expected positive effects on human capital and average 
wages of the firm. 
 
 Direction of causality will be analyzed using the definition of firms that start to 
export or firms that start to produce with higher quality, versus firms that do not export 
or firms that do not increase their product quality. The test analyzes how exports or 
higher product quality affect firms that start these actions in subsequent years. If exports 
or higher product quality increase wages and productivity, we would  observe a wage 
rise and productivity rise in subsequent years after the decision to export or to increase 
product quality. In contrast, if the relevant hypothesis is that more-productive firms 
decide to export or to increase product quality, we would not observe statistically 
significant temporal effects. 
  
 The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the dataset and the two 
indicators used in order to measure product quality: R&D and advertising expenditures 
over sales and carrying out or contracting standardization and control works. Section 3 
estimates demand equations for skilled employees (college graduates and engineers) and 
wages equations. These estimations show positive correlations between exports, product 
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quality and human capital and average wages of the firm. Section 4 studies the direction 
of the causality and tests the hypothesis that exports and higher product quality increase 
wages and productivities or whether more-productive firms decide to export or decide to 
raise product quality. Section 5 summarizes and concludes. 
 
2. THE DATA 
 
The ESEE (this survey has its origin in an agreement subscribed in the year 1990 
between the Ministry of Industry and the SEPI Foundation, formerly the Fundación 
Empresa Pública (Public Firm Foundation)) is an unbalanced panel of Spanish 
manufacturing firms since 1990. This database contains information about an average 
sample of 1,800 firms every year, and includes information about activity, products and 
manufacturing processes, customers and suppliers, costs and prices, markets covered, 
technological activities, income statements, accounting balance sheets, employment and 
foreign trade. Firms with less than 10 employees were excluded from the survey. All 
firms which have over 200 employees are included along with a random sample of the 
rest (firms with 10 to 200 employees). Most of the variables included are yearly, but 
there are others where the information is only updated every four years, such as the 
percentage of college graduates and engineers of total employees and the information 
about works carried out or contracted by the firms on normalization and quality control. 
 
 Table A1 in the appendix gives a brief statistical description of some interesting 
variables. Averages wages of the firm are labour cost per employee (labour cost divided 
per yearly average of total employment). Exporter firms have higher wages and higher 
sales per employee than non-exporter firms, and are also larger. The percentage of 
exporter firms with more than 49 employees is 69.4%, whereas in non-exporters it is 
only 19.6%. The percentage of college graduates and engineers is 5.6% in exporter and 
2.9% in non-exporter firms (38% of the firms do not have employees with theses 
degrees). The percentage of total sales exported (export propensity) is 28.9% for 
exporter firms. We also observe that the percentage of firms which control their quality 
is 55.5% within exporter firms, whereas within non-exporter firms it is only 27.1%. The 
percentage of R&D and advertising expenditures over sales is also higher in exporter 
firms - 2.7% versus 1.4% for non-exporter firms. 
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 The ESEE does not contain information about whether a firm has any ISO 
certification of its product quality. Therefore, we use a measure for quality from Sutton 
(1998) –R&D and advertising expenditures over sales- and the information obtained 
every four years about whether a firm has carried out or contracted quality 
standardization and control works (quality control). We can observe in the following 
tables that these measures for quality behave as expected. Table 1 shows how in all the 
years where information about control quality is available there is a positive relation 
between this variable and the percentage of college graduates and engineers, the export 
propensity and the average wage of the firm. These same positive correlations are 
observed between R&D and advertising expenditures over sales and the percentage of 
graduates and the average firm wage (for all years between 1990 and 2010 in the latter 
case). The positive correlations between R&D and advertising expenditures over sales 
and export propensity are not significant only in 1991 and 1992  
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
 Table 2 also shows a positive relation between these variables by industries. In 
the vast majority of cases theses correlations are significant. The correlations between 
R&D and advertising expenditures over sales and export propensity are not significant 
in Meat products, Food and tobacco, Paper and Computer products, electronics and 
optical.  
 
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
 Table 3 shows several ratios by years between the measures of product quality, 
average firm wage, exporter status and percentage of college graduates and engineers of 
the firm. In the first three columns we can see that the firms which invest in R&D and 
advertising have higher percentages of college graduates, higher wages and greater 
export propensity than firms which do not invest, since all the ratios are higher than one. 
This same behaviour is observed the second three columns for firms which control their 
product quality versus firms which do not. Finally, the last two columns show that R&D 
and advertising expenditures over sales and quality control are higher in exporter than 
non-exporter firms. 
 7
 
Insert Table 3 about here 
 
3. HUMAN CAPITAL, WAGES AND PRODUCT QUALITY 
 
First I estimate demand equations for skilled employees in order to analyze the 
correlations between theses employees and product quality. A positive correlation 
between exports and human capital of the firm has been pointed to in many papers since 
Bernard and Jensen (1997). Alcalá and Hernández (2010) cite several of them. A 
positive correlation between product quality and demand for skilled employees has been 
recently suggested by Verhoogen (2008) and Bustos (2011).  
 
 In equation (1) the dependent variable ejt is the percentage of collage graduates 
and engineers of the firm j in the year t, and I have chosen the tobit specification to 
estimate the correlations with the age of the firm, the firm size (employees), exporter 
status (a dummy equal to unity when the firm has exported) and the quality indicator: 
 
 
32
6
543210
*
jttjt
jtjtjtjtjtjt
vIndustry
QualityExporterSizeSizeAgee
++
++++++=
γα
αααααα
 (1) 
),0max( *jtjt ee = ; jtv ~Normal(0, σ2), 
 
where Size2 is a dummy variable for firm size which corresponds to firms employing 
between 50 and 249 workers and Size3 corresponds to firms with more than 249 
workers. Exporter is the dummy for exporter status and Quality is the quality indicator, 
which can be the R&D and advertising expenses over sales suggested by Sutton (1998) 
or a dummy variable which takes the value one when firm has carried out or contracted 
quality standardization and control works (I will also estimate specifications with both 
quality indicators). Additionally, I include a vector of dummies for industries and 
another vector γ of dummies for years. 
 
Table 4 shows the results. In column (1) we observe that exporting firms have a 
higher demand for college graduates and engineers (Alcalá and Hernández, 2010). The 
inclusion of R&D and advertising over sales in column (2) or the inclusion of the 
dummy for control quality in column (3), and even the inclusion of both variables in 
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column (4), have a positive effect on demand for college graduates and engineers. 
Marginal effects show that firms which carry out or contract quality standardization and 
control works increase the percentage of college graduates and engineers by almost one 
percentage point. Moreover, a 10 percentage point increase in R&D and advertising 
over sales increases the percentage of college graduates and engineers by 1.2 percentage 
points. The results of interaction terms between quality indicators and export propensity 
and those between quality indicators and dummies for firm size are not reported as they 
are not statistically significant.3 
 
Insert Table 4 about here 
 
 Table 5 shows the estimates of following wage equation, where the wage of the 
firm, wjt, is the total labour cost divided per average yearly of total employment of the 
firm j in the year t.  
 
jttjtjt
jtjtjtjtjtjt
uIndustryQuality
ExportereSizeSizeAgew
+++
++++++=
δββ
ββββββ
76
543210 32ln   (2) 
 
 In column (1) we observe the standard results about positive relations between 
the firm size (employees), the human capital of the firm (skilled employees), the 
exporter status and wages. Moreover, older firms pay higher wages. A one-year increase 
raises average firm wages by 0.31%. The exporter wage premium is 8.6% (e(0.083)-1). 
This effect is only slightly lees than that obtained by Alcalá and Hernández (2010).4 
 
Columns (2)-(6) include the product quality indicators. The wage effect of R&D 
and advertising expenses over sales is statistically significant only when the percentages 
of college graduates and engineers of the firm in column (4) are not included. Moreover, 
in this case, the wage effect is quite small. A 10 percentage point increase in the 
percentage of theses expenses only increases the average wage of the firm by 0.03 
percentages points. However, the wage effect in column (5) of a dummy which takes the 
                                                 
3 Results are available upon request. 
 
4 The exporting wage premium obtained with hourly wages with ESEE -9.3%- is very similar to the 
figure obtained with yearly wages, but I prefer to use yearly wages because the information about the 
number of yearly worked hours in 1990 is very scarce and it reduces the number of observations. 
Nevertheless, those estimates are available upon request. 
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value one when the firm has invested in R&D and advertising and zero otherwise has an 
important and statistically significant effect, because it represents a 4.4% wage increase. 
The dummy for quality control is also statistically significant and has a wage impact 
similar. According to column (3), the firms which control their product quality pay 
wages 4.7% higher than firms which do not carry out this control. In column (6) I 
include both dummies of product quality (R&D and advertising expenses and quality 
control) and we can see that both are statistically significant and have similar wage 
effects. As estimations of demand of college graduates and engineers, the interaction 
terms between quality indicators, exporter status, percentage of college graduates and 
engineers and dummies variables for firm sizes are not statistically significant. 
 
Insert Table 5 about here 
 
4. CAUSALITY 
 
The direction of the causality between product quality and wages may not be as in the 
previous analysis, but it is possible that, instead of higher product quality increase 
productivity and wages of the firms, the more-productive firms –and the firms that pay 
higher wages- decide to increase their product quality. 
 
To carry out this analysis I use the methodology proposed by Schank et al. 
(2010) in the context of exporter wage premium. Theses authors observe how firms 
behave in periods of 6 consecutive years. They start at a point in time when none of the 
firms exported, and end when some have been exporting for a while. According to these 
authors, using observation periods of 6 years, an exporter starter is defined as not 
exporting in t = 1, 2, 3 and exporting in t = 4, 5, 6. Moreover, if a firm has been 
observed more than six times in the sample, then in all observed years after t = 6 it must 
have been an exporter and in all the observed years before t = 1 it must have exports 
equal to zero. If this is not the case, the firm must be dropped from the sample. 
Obviously, non-exporters are firms that do not export in any of the years t=1,…, 6, nor 
in the observed years before t = 1 and after t = 6. Using the ESEE data from 1990 to 
2010, we can define 6-year windows (from 1990 to 1995, from 1991 to 1996, …, from 
2005 to 2010). Theses data for export starters and non-exporters are pooled over these 
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sixteen cohorts. So, it is possible that a firm was first a non-exporter and then an export 
starter, but not vice versa. 
 
Estimates of Schank et al. (2010) show that wages and labour productivity (sales 
per employee) of exporter starters are higher than non-exporter firms but that temporal 
effects are not statistically significant. That is, neither the difference in the wages nor 
the difference in productivity changes over the years; neither in the years before the 
starters begin to export (t = 2, 3) nor the years after starting to export (t = 4, 5, 6). 
According to these results, these authors conclude that firms with a higher productivity 
(and higher wages) self-select into export markets. This result is in line with the main 
idea of model of Melitz (2003), who emphasizes that firm heterogeneity is a 
phenomenon that can help explain the distribution of trade flows. Greeneway and 
Kneller (2007) state that only more-productive firms can bear the higher cost of entering 
international markets. 
 
First, I perform the same analysis for exporter and non-exporter firms and I then 
apply this methodology in the context of the quality producer wage premium. Table 6 
shows the labour productivity (sales per employee) and average firm wage for export 
starters and non-exporters with ESEE data from 1990 to 2010. We can observe that in 
the six periods considered the 110 export starters have higher levels of productivity and 
wages than the 3,982 non-exporters. These differences are statistically significant in all 
cases. 
 
Insert Table 6 about here 
 
 Table 7 shows the estimates of wage and productivity equations with a 
subsample of export starters and non-exporters. Apart from the regressors include in 
equation (2), I have included a dummy variable for export starters and interaction terms 
between these and the six time periods considered. These equations are also estimated 
with another overlap sample of firms in order to avoid the problem of some firms’ not 
being comparable to others due to lack of overlap in the distribution of firms’ 
characteristics between exporters and non-exporters. I use the methodology proposed by 
Crump et al. (2009), who discard all firms with estimated propensity scores outside the 
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range [0.1, 0.9]. Table A2 of appendix shows the probit model that estimates the 
probability of starting to export. 
 
Insert Table 7 about here 
 
 All estimates obtained with the full sample and with the overlap sample point in 
the same direction. The export starters pay higher wages, whose increase ranges from 
the 12.4% obtained with the full sample to 20.1% with the overlap sample. The export 
starters also present higher labour productivity (sales per employee) than non-exporters 
with a 44% increase in full sample and a 31.6% in overlap sample. However, the 
interaction terms between this dummy variable and dummies for the six periods 
considered are not statistically significant in any case. Consequently, neither wages nor 
productivity shows significant increases in years before and after the decision to export. 
Therefore, the causality relation is not due to the learning-by-exporting hypothesis 
(exports generate a higher productivity and higher wages), but to the self-selection 
hypothesis. That is to say, more-productive firms manage to break into international 
markets because this higher productivity can bear the higher cost of entering entailed. 
Schank et al. (2010) obtain similar results for the German economy. 
 
This same methodology can be applied to causality relation between product 
quality and wages. Similarly to previous analyses, we can define a set of firms which 
start to increase their product quality versus firms which never do. The test also 
analyzes the evolution of the labour productivity and wages of starters before and after 
the decision to control the quality. If this evolution shows a positive increase, we will 
conclude that higher product quality increases productivity and wages. However, if 
theses variables are not affected in the years after the increase in quality, although they 
are higher than those observed in firms which do not increase their product quality, we 
will conclude that more productive firms decide to improve their product quality and, 
therefore, the direction of causality is the opposite. In other words, product quality does 
not increase productivity, but the more productive firms do decide to improve their 
product quality. 
 
This methodology has only been carried out in case of export starters and non-
exporters when we use R&D and advertising expenses over sales as a measure of 
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product quality (Sutton, 1998). We define a firm as starting to improve its product 
quality if in the six-year period considered it does not carries out R&D and advertising 
expenses in the three first years and has positive values for this variable in the three 
following. We define a firm as not improving its product quality when it presents zero 
values of this variable for all the six-year periods considered.  
 
With the other measure of product quality –whether the firm has carried out or 
contracted quality standardization and control works- we can only ascertain the above 
for every four years (1990, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006 and 2010). Therefore, in this case, 
the previous methodology has slightly been modified and I have defined three cohorts 
of 4 years (from 1990 to 2002, from 1994 to 2006 and from 1998 to 2010), where I have 
supposed that a firm starts to increase its product quality when it does not control it in 
the two first years but does in the two following years. A firm never increases its 
product quality if it does not control it in all the 4 years considered. 
 
Table 8 shows the average labour productivity (sales per employee) obtained and 
average firm wages (labour cost per employee) and the statistic test which controls 
whether these averages are statistically identical between the firms which either start to 
invest in R&D and advertising or start to control their product quality, versus the firms 
which neither invest in R&D and advertising nor control their product quality.  
 
 Labour productivity and average wages of firms which start to invest in R&D 
and advertising are higher than in firms which do not invest. The wage differentials are 
statistically significant, but the differentials in labour productivity are not. In the case of 
firms which start carrying out or contracting quality standardization and control works, 
wages and labour productivity are higher than in firms which do not, and these 
differences are all statistically significant. 
 
Insert Table 8 about here 
 
Table 9 shows the results of estimated wages and productivity equations for 
investor starter and non-investor firms. The quality producer wage premium is 20.8% in 
the full sample and 27.6% in the overlap sample (estimated model of probability of 
starting to invest in R&D and advertising is in Table A2 of the appendix) and, as in the 
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context of exporter firms, the interaction terms between the dummy of starting to invest 
and dummies for the six considered periods are not statistically significant in any case. 
Therefore, once again the wages do not show significant increases in the years before 
and after the decision to invest. In the case of the labour productivity equation, the firms 
which start to invest in R&D and advertising are only more productive in the full 
sample (statistically significant at 10%), and the temporal effects are not significant. In 
the overlap sample there are no statistically significant differences in any case. 
 
Insert Table 9 about here 
 
Table 10 shows the results when we use quality control as a measure of product 
quality. I include only 4 t periods because this information is only updated every 4 
years. The results point in the same line. Firms which start to control their product 
quality are more productive and pay higher wages than firms which do not in both the 
samples. The quality producer wage premium is 12.6% in the full sample and 8.8% in 
the overlap sample (this last premium only is statistically significant at 10%), but the 
interactions terms between the dummies for starter firms and dummies for the 4 periods 
considered are not statistically significant, and  neither is the  wage equation nor the 
productivity equation. Consequently, as in the context of exporter firms, there is no 
evidence that firms that increase their product quality become more productive and pay 
higher wages (similar to the learning-by-exporting hypothesis, we could speak in this 
case that there is no evidence in favour of learning by producing quality). Therefore, I 
conclude that more-productive firms with higher wages decide to increase product 
quality because their higher productivity means these kinds of decisions and 
investments can be taken with more guarantees, so I find evidence for the self-selection 
hypothesis. 
 
Insert Table 10 about here 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The exporting wage premium has been widely tested in the literature. Many of the 
studies on this topic seek to ascertain whether firms which start to export are more 
productive and pay higher wages (the learning-by-exporting hypothesis) or, in contrast, 
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higher productivity in exporting firms is due to self-selection of more productive firms 
to break into export markets (the self-selection hypothesis). The findings for pre-entry 
differences present evidence in favour of the latter, whereas findings supporting the 
learning-by-exporting hypothesis are mixed (Wagner, 2012). Singh (2010) concludes 
that, at firm level, the studies supporting self-selection clearly outnumber those 
supporting learning-by-exporting. Applying the methodology proposed by Schank et al. 
(2010) to the Spanish ESEE dataset (1990-2010) I also obtain evidence in favour of the 
second. However, the main finding of this paper is that there is a quality producer wage 
premium similar to exporter wage premium. Firms which carry out or contract quality 
standardization and control works increase their percentage of college graduates and 
engineers by almost one percentage point. Moreover, a 10 percentage-point increase in 
R&D and advertising in sales (Sutton’s measure for product quality) increases the 
percentage of college graduates and engineers by 1.2 percentage points. Consequently, 
firms with greater product-quality pay higher wages. The estimated quality producer 
wage premium with this Spanish dataset is around 4.4%-4.7%, but it can reach more 
than 20% for firms which start to improve their product quality.  
 
I have used the methodology proposed by Schank et al. (2010) in order to 
ascertain the origin of both the exporter wage premium and the quality producer wage 
premium. In both cases, the results point in the same line. I do not find evidence in 
favour of exporter firms, and firms which increase their product quality become more 
productive and pay higher wages. In other words, I find no evidence in favour of the 
learning-by-exporting hypothesis. All the results indicate that more-productive firms 
with higher wages manage to break into international markets and decide to increase 
product quality, that is, the evidence favours the self-selection hypothesis. 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Alcalá, F. and Hernández, P.J. (2010). Firms' Main Market, Human Capital, and Wages. 
SERIES Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, I(4), 433-458. 
Bernard, A.B., and J.B. Jensen (1995). Exporters, jobs, and wages in U.S. 
manufacturing: 1976-1987. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 
Microeconomics, 1, 67-119. 
Bernard, A.B., and J.B. Jensen (1997). Exporters, skill upgrading, and the wage gap. 
Journal of International Economics, 42, 3-31. 
 15
Bernard, A.B., Jensen, J.B., Redding, S.J. and Schott, P.K. (2011). The empirics of firm 
heterogeneity and international trade. NBER Working Paper 17627. 
Bustos, P. (2011). The Impact of Trade Liberalization on Skill Upgrading. Evidence 
from Argentina. Mimeo. 
Crump, R.K., Hotz, V.J., Imbens, G.W. and Mitnik, O.A. (2009). Dealing with Limited 
Overlap in Estimation of Average Treatment Effects. Biometrika, 96(1), 187-
199. 
Delgado, M.A., Fariñas, J.C. and Ruano, S. (2002). Firm productivity and export 
markets: a non-parametric approach. Journal of Intenational Economics, 57, 
397-422. 
Idson, T.L., and Oi, W.Y. (1999). Workers are more productive in large firms. 
American Economic Review, 89, 104-108. 
Greeneway, D. and Kneller, D. (2007). Firm heterogeneity, exporting and foreign direct 
investment: A survey. Economic Journal, 117(517), F134-F161. 
Guadalupe, M: (2007). Product market competition, returns to skill, and wage 
inequality. Journal of Labor Economics, 25(3), 439-474. 
Kugler, M. and Verhoogen, E. (2011). Prices, Plant Size, and Product Quality. 
Forhcoming Review of Economic Studies. 
Manjón, M., Máñez, J.A., Rochina-Barrachina, M.E. and Sanchis-Llopis, J.A. (2012). 
Reconsidering learning by exporting. Mimeo. 
Máñez-Castillejo, J.A., Rochina-Barrachina, M.E. and Sanchis-Llopis, J.A. (2010). 
Does Firm Size Affect Self-selection and Learning-by-Exporting?. The World 
Economy, 33(3), 315-346. 
Melitz, M.J. (2003). The impact of trade on intra-industry reallocations and aggregate 
industry productivity. Econometrica, 71(5), 1695-1725. 
Schank, T., C. Schnabel, and J. Wagner (2010). Higher Wages in Exporting Firms: Self-
Selection, Export Effect, or Both? First evidence from German linked employer-
employee data. Review of World Economics, 146(2), 303-322. 
Serti, F. and Tomasi, Ch. (2008). Self-Selection and Post-Entry Effects of Exports: 
Evidence from Italian Manufacturing Firms. Review of World Economics, 
144(4), 660-694. 
Singh, T. (2010). Does international trade cause economic growth? A survey. The Word 
Economy, 33(11), 1517-1564. 
Sutton, J. (1998). Technology and Market Structure: Theory and History. MIT Press, 
Cambridge Mass. 
Verhoogen, E.A. (2008). Trade, Quality Upgrading and Wage Inequality in the Mexican 
Manufacturing Sector. Quaterly Journal of Economics, 123(2), 489-530. 
Wagner, J. (2007). Export and productivity: A survey of the evidence from firm-level 
data. The World Economy, 30(1), 60-82. 
Wagner, J. (2012). International trade and firm performance: a survey. Review of World 
Economics, 148, 235-267. 
 16
APPENDIX 
Table A1. Survey on Companies’ Strategies 1990-2010 
 All firms Exporters Non-exporters 
 Average Observat. Average Observat. Average Observat.
Average 
wages 
25655.8 
(12416.6) 
38549 
29123.4 
(12600.1) 
23078 
20443.3 
(10095.9) 
15364 
Sales per 
employee 
138957.7 
(177153.2) 
38559 
172128.4 
(203636.5)
23083 
88936.8 
(109084.6) 
15371 
Age 
34.19 
(21.76) 
47442 
39.07 
(23.86) 
22553 
28.95 
(17.14) 
15371 
Size (employees)      
Less 
than 50 
0.504 38637 0.305 23083 0.804 15371 
Between 
50-249 
0.248 38637 0.320 23083 0.142 15371 
More 
than 249 
0.247 38637 0.374 23083 0.054 15371 
Percentage 
of graduates 
4.550 
(7.471) 
47186 
5.641 
(7.147) 
22360 
2.914 
(7.130) 
15110 
Export 
propensity 
17.370 
(25.380) 
38671 
28.953 
(27.173) 
23201   
R+D and 
advertising 
over sales 
(%)  
2.175 
(19.721) 
38223 
2.694 
(4.848) 
22781 
1.404 
(30.533) 
15355 
Quality 
control 
0.434 47494 0.555 22548 0.271 15142 
Standard deviations are in brackets. 
 
Table A2. Probit models 
 Probability of start to export 
Probability of start 
to invest in R&D 
and advertising 
Probability of start 
to control the 
product quality  
Log (productivity) 0.533 (16.37) 0.288 (5.59) 0.774 (8.34) 
Percentage of 
graduates 0.004 (1.47) 0.050 (4.78) 0.008 (1.17) 
Size (employees)    
Between 50-
249 0.549 (9.79) 0.428 (3.10) 0.576 (4.56) 
More than 
249 1.494 (16.52) -0.602 (2.41) 2.269 (7.68) 
Exporter  0.190 (1.75) 0.130 (1.25) 
Age/10 -0.061 (4.67) 0.141 (4.96) -0.129 (3.65) 
Observations 23,045 3,659 2,369 
Pseudo R2 0.212 0.296 0.339 
All estimated models include a constant, dummies for industries and years. |z|-statistics are in brackets. 
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Table 1. Correlations between the quality measures and the percentage of college 
graduates, the export propensity and the average firm wages by year 
 Quality control R&D and advertising expenditures over sales (%) 
 
Percentage 
of 
graduates 
Export 
propensity 
Average 
firm wage 
Percentage 
of 
graduates 
Export 
propensity 
Average 
firm wage 
1990 0.1302* 0.1378* 0.2312* 0.2980* 0.0548* 0.1957* 
1991     0.0332 0.2534* 
1992     0.0324 0.2715* 
1993     0.0436** 0.2614* 
1994 0.2110* 0.2471* 0.3635* 0.3335* 0.0668* 0.3026* 
1995     0.2663* 0.2779* 
1996     0.1117* 0.2987* 
1997     0.0814* 0.296* 
1998 0.1688* 0.2683* 0.3502* 0.3360* 0.0845* 0.2927* 
1999     0.1260* 0.2852* 
2000     0.0801* 0.2602* 
2001     0.0603* 0.2568* 
2002 0.1761* 0.2131* 0.3160* 0.3174* 0.0806* 0.2447* 
2003     0.0525* 0.2701* 
2004     0.0634* 0.2974* 
2005     0.2663* 0.0657* 
2006 0.1156* 0.1166* 0.1837* 0.3370* 0.0709* 0.2505* 
2007     0.0871* 0.2587* 
2008     0.1002* 0.2251* 
2009     0.1231* 0.2006* 
2010 0.1711* 0.1940* 0.2367* 0.2364* 0.1171* 0.1705* 
* Means significant at 5%. ** Means significant at 10%. 
 
 18
 
Table 2. Correlations between the quality measures and the percentage of college 
graduates, and the export propensity and the average firm wages by industries 
 Quality control R&D and advertising expenditures over sales (%) 
 
Percentage 
of 
graduates 
Export 
propensity 
Average 
firm wage 
Percentage 
of 
graduates 
Export 
propensity 
Average 
firm wage 
1 0.2030* 0.1153* 0.2310* 0.3422* -0.0282 0.4189* 
2 0.2225* 0.1737* 0.2098* 0.2512* 0.0023 0.3059* 
3 0.2124* 0.1059** 0.1448* 0.1824* 0.2297* 0.3894* 
4 0.0903* 0.2381* 0.1941* 0.0771* 0.114* 0.1069* 
5 0.1631* 0.1816* 0.1401* 0.0701* 0.1976* 0.1878* 
6 0.1407* 0.0512 0.1578* 0.1649* 0.0506** 0.1146* 
7 0.2112* 0.2965* 0.2266* 0.0838* -0.031 0.1291* 
8 -0.0804 0.1674* 0.1170* 0.4497* -0.0905* 0.3046* 
9 0.1352* 0.0087 0.1861* 0.3168* -0.2047* 0.1781* 
10 0.1844* 0.2345* 0.1812* 0.1986* 0.1142* 0.0739* 
11 0.1569* 0.0942* 0.1998* 0.1112* 0.3648* 0.103* 
12 0.1082* 0.0955** 0.1013* 0.0628* 0.1603* -0.0738* 
13 0.1475* 0.1996* 0.1534* 0.1113* 0.1717* 0.117* 
14 0.1849* 0.2074* 0.1756* 0.1087* 0.1418* 0.0686* 
15 0.0962** 0.1047** 0.0633 0.2809* 0.0186 0.1277* 
16 0.0709** 0.1617* 0.1199* 0.1707* 0.1495* 0.1256* 
17 0.1146* 0.1222* 0.0932* 0.1392* 0.1448* 0.0830* 
18 0.1734* 0.1411* 0.1973* 0.3382* 0.1481* 0.1061* 
19 0.2295* 0.1599* 0.2503* 0.1473* 0.168* 0.1640* 
20 0.0875 0.1601* 0.1231* 0.0146 0.2509* 0.1623* 
* Means significant at 5%. ** Means significant at 10%. The correlations of quality control only includes 
the years where information is available (1990, 1994, 1998, 2002 and 2006). Industries: 1 Meat products; 
2 Food and tobacco; 3 Beverage; 4 Textiles and clothing; 5 Leather, fur and footwear; 6 Timber; 7 Paper; 
8 Printing and Edition; 9 Chemicals products; 10 Plastic and rubber products; 11 Non-metal mineral 
products; 12 Basic metal products; 13 Fabricated metal products; 14 Machinery and equipment; 15 
Computer products, electronics and optical; 16 Electric materials and accessories; 17 Vehicles and 
accessories; 18 Other transport equipment; 19 Furniture; 20 Other manufacturing 
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Table 3. Ratios 
 Firms with R&D and advertising expenditures versus firms without these expenditures 
Firms which control their product quality 
versus firms which do not Exporter versus non-exporter 
 Percentage of graduates 
Average firm 
wage 
Export 
propensity 
Percentage 
of graduates 
Average 
firm wage 
Export 
propensity 
R&D and advertising 
expenditures over sales
Quality 
control 
1990 2.25 1.31 1.93 1.66 1.25 1.72 2.11 1.84 
1991  1.32 2.00    2.38  
1992  1.31 2.47    2.31  
1993  1.39 2.49    2.80  
1994 2.76 1.43 2.36 1.79 1.39 2.15 2.92 2.61 
1995  1.39 2.28    3.20  
1996  1.38 2.14    3.02  
1997  1.33 1.88    2.76  
1998 2.09 1.29 1.82 1.57 1.36 2.11 2.91 2.32 
1999  1.33 2.27    2.91  
2000  1.35 2.09    2.49  
2001  1.34 2.25    2.15  
2002 2.26 1.33 2.34 1.63 1.30 1.77 2.55 2.29 
2003  1.28 1.72    2.32  
2004  1.26 1.83    2.49  
2005  1.24 2.04    2.55  
2006 1.96 1.19 1.96 1.42 1.17 1.39 2.37 1.71 
2007  1.18 1.74    2.69  
2008  1.21 1.86    2.96  
2009  1.18 1.84    3.09  
2010 1.89 1.21 1.84 1.54 1.20 1.67 2.69 1.86 
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Table 4. Tobit estimates of the demand of skilled employees. Dependent variable: percentage of college graduates and engineers.  
 Coefficients Marginal effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Percentage of R&D and 
advertising expenses over sales  
0.260 
(13.94)  
0.251 
(13.55)  0.126  0.121 
Quality control   1.858 (9.52) 
1.686 
(8.67)   0.905 0.813 
Exporter 2.894 (12.88) 
2.664 
(11.91) 
2.674 
(11.92) 
2.475 
(11.09) 1.411 1.287 1.302 1.194 
Size (employees)         
50-249 employees 4.568 (19.38) 
4.391 
(18,76) 
4.194 
(17.79) 
4.056 
(17.32) 2.227 2.121 2.042 1.957 
More than 249 
employees 
6.046 
(22.44) 
5.616 
(20,86) 
5.496 
(20.23) 
5.132 
(18.91) 2.947 2.7132 2.676 2.476 
Age 0.027 (5,95) 
0.023 
(5.16) 
0.026 
(5.88) 
0.023 
(5.09)     
Observations 11,240 11,115 11,223 9132     
Firms 4,660 4,639 4655 4009     
Only observations of years where information about percentage of college graduates and engineers and quality control is updated is included: 1990, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006 
and 2010. All estimated equations include a constant and dummies for industries and years. |t|-statistics are in brackets. 
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Table 5. OLS estimates of wage equation. Dependent variable: logarithm of 
average firm wage. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Percentage of R&D 
and advertising 
expenses over sales 
 0.0006 (0.62)  
0.003 
(2.13)   
Dummy=1 if R&D 
and advertising 
expenses>0  
    0,043 (4,81) 
0,038 
(4,18) 
Quality control   0.046 (6.81)   
0.043 
(6.26) 
Size (employees)       
50-249 
employees 
0.199 
(17.82) 
0.198 
(17.79) 
0.189 
(16.89) 
0.212 
(18.10) 
0.195 
(17.52) 
0.187 
(16.69) 
More than 249 
employees 
0.332 
(25.88) 
0.332 
(25.75) 
0.318 
(24.70) 
0.359 
(25.85) 
0.327 
(25.53) 
0.315 
(24.49) 
Percentage of college 
graduates and 
engineers 
0.012 
(15.09) 
0.012 
(14.69) 
0.012 
(15.24)  
0.012 
(14.90) 
0.012 
(15.06) 
Exporter 0.083 (8.62) 
0.083 
(8.51) 
0.077 
(8.05) 
0.091 
(8.95) 
0.076 
(7.85) 
0.072 
(7.41) 
Age/10 0.031 (14,35) 
0.031 
(14.42) 
0.031 
(14.34) 
0.032 
(14.30) 
0.030 
(14.20) 
0.030 
(14.21) 
R2 0.640 0.641 0.641 0.619 0.641 0.642 
Observations 11,235 11,110 11,218 11,193 11,235 11,218 
Firms 4,659 4,638 4,654 4,649 4,659 4,654 
Only observations of years where information about percentage of college graduates and engineers and 
quality control is updated is included: 1990, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006 and 2010. All estimated equations 
include a constant and dummies for industries and years. |t|-statistics are in parentheses. Standard errors 
are corrected for heteroskedascity and for the clustered sampling scheme. 
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Table 6. Descriptive statistics for export starter and non-exporter firms. 
 Export starters (N=110) 
Non-exporters 
(N=3,982) 
Prob-value for 
differences of 
means = 0 
Labour productivity (in €)   
t = 1 76,804.1 49,398.3 0.00 
t = 2 80,736.8 49,632.9 0.00 
t = 3 82,433.2 50,082.9 0.00 
t = 4 87,084.0 50,199.6 0.00 
t = 5 89,702.1 50,236.2 0.00 
t = 6 94,321.8 50,240.9 0.00 
Average wage (in €)    
t = 1 15,332.8 12,599.9 0.00 
t = 2 15,463.8 12,685.6 0.00 
t = 3 15,750.6 12,817.7 0.00 
t = 4 16,254.5 12,869.4 0.00 
t = 5 16,443.8 12,921.0 0.00 
t = 6 16,605.5 13,038.3 0.00 
Wages and sales are deflated by the aggregate consumer price index. 
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Table 7. Export starters and non-exporters. Dependent variables: logarithm of 
average firm wage and logarithm of firm labour productivity (sales per employee) 
 log (wage) log(productivity) 
 Full sample Overlap sample Full sample 
Overlap 
sample 
Export starter 0.117 (3.99) 0.189 (4.29) 0.365 (5.66) 0.275 (3.04) 
(t = 2)*export starter -0.002 (0. 50) -0.009 (0.14) 0.009 (0.10) 0.064 (0.53) 
(t = 3)*export starter 0.003 (0.08) -0.048 (0.82) 0.009 (0.10) 0.023 (0.19) 
(t = 4)*export starter 0.026 (0.61) -0.021 (0.34) 0.069 (0.73) 0.160 (1.27) 
(t = 5)*export starter 0.036 (0.88) 0.026 (0.44) 0.099 (1.06) 0.124 (0.91) 
(t = 6)*export starter 0.037 (0.92) -0.018 (0.30) 0.117 (1.26) 0.147 (1.08) 
Size (employees)     
50-249 
employees 
0.186 (26.03) -0.018 (0.89) 0.184 (14.00) -0.477 (13.23)
More than 
249 
employees 
0.327 (21.37) -0.060 (2.14) 0.482 (11.05) -0.969 (17.70)
Percentage of 
college graduates 
and engineers 
0.010 (25.14) 0.016 (15.29) 0.017 (19.22) 0.014 (7.28) 
Age/10 0.049 (38.40) 0.069 (15.74) 0.055 (20.94) 0.066 (7.83) 
R2 0.389 0.586 0.348 0.588 
Observations 24,370 2,531 24,375 2,531 
Firms 4,092 1,940 4,092 1,940 
Wages and sales are deflated by the aggregate consumer price index. Only observations of years where 
information about percentage of college graduates and engineers is updated are included: 1990, 1994, 
1998, 2002, 2006 and 2010. All estimated equations (OLS) include a constant and dummies for 
industries, years and periods t. |t|-statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are corrected for 
heteroskedascity and for the clustered sampling scheme 
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Table 8. Labour productivity and average wages 
 R&D and advertising expenses over sales Carrying out or contracting quality standardization and control works  
Starters (N=32) Non-investors (N=616) 
Prob-value for 
differences of 
means=0 
Starters (N=58) Non-controllers (N=603) 
Prob-value for 
differences of 
means=0 
Labour productivity      
t = 1 118,668.4 80,765.2 0.10 76,158.8 48,840.7 0.00 
t = 2 120,281.6 84,240.1 0.14 82,850.6 48,270.5 0.00 
t = 3 128,452.1 87,812.0 0.16 102,815.6 51,608.9 0.00 
t = 4 109,520.6 92,715.6 0.37 116,937.8 52,135.5 0.00 
t = 5 108,935.6 96,665.7 0.41    
t = 6 102,707.9 102,689.6 0.50    
Wages       
t = 1 16,193.1 12,243.9 0.00 15,912.0 12,101.5 0.00 
t = 2 15,821.5 12,309.5 0.00 15,803.8 12,222.1 0.00 
t = 3 16,464.8 12,411.8 0.00 17,252.3 12,663.8 0.00 
t = 4 16,512.2 12,462.9 0.00 17,813.5 13,309.2 0.00 
t = 5 15,615.3 12,495.1 0.00    
t = 6 16,087.3 12,621.3 0.00    
Wages and sales are deflated by the aggregate consumer price index.  
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Table 9. Firms which start to invest in R&D and advertising and firms which do 
not. Dependent variables: logarithm of average firm wage and logarithm of firm 
labour productivity (sales per employee) 
 log (wage) log(productivity) 
 Full sample Overlap sample Full sample 
Overlap 
sample 
Starter 0.189 (3.35) 0.244 (3.69) 0.319 (1.76) 0.132 (0.69) 
(t = 2)*Starter -0.044 (0.61) -0.067 (0.69) 0.015 (0.07) -0.125 (0.48) 
(t = 3)*Starter -0.001 (0.02) -0.012 (0.13) 0.076 (0.34) -0.058 (0.22) 
(t = 4)*Starter 0.024 (0.32) -0.133 (1.36) 0.159 (0.70) -0.199 (0.77) 
(t = 5)*Starter -0.049 (0.69) -0.122 (1.42) 0.040 (0.19) -0.324 (1.35) 
(t = 6)*Starter -0.067 (0.98) -0.080 (0.87) -0.075 (0.36) -0.222 (0.89) 
Size (employees)     
50-249 
employees 0.144 (8.40) 0.139 (2.59) 0.261 (5.58) 0.087 (0.73) 
More than 
249 
employees 
0.334 (15.11) 0.570 (6.03) 0.615 (8.99) 0.112 (0.66) 
Percentage of 
college graduates 
and engineers 
0.022 (17.72) 0.009 (2.28) 0.064 (20.03) 0.015 (1.99) 
Exporter 0.253 (18.76) 0.193 (5.41) 0.741 (19.54) -0.060 (0.79) 
Age/10 0.042 (11.26) 0.014 (1.21) -0.039 (3.26) 0.041 (1.54) 
R2 0.561 0.655 0.544 0.651 
Observations 3827 486 3827 486 
Firms 648 325 648 325 
Wages and sales are deflated by the aggregate consumer price index. All estimated equations (OLS) 
include a constant and dummies for industries, years and periods t. |t|-statistics are in brackets. Standard 
errors are corrected for heteroskedascity and for the clustered sampling scheme. 
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Table 10. Firms which start to control their product quality and firms which do 
not. Dependent variables: logarithm of average firm wage and logarithm of firm 
labour productivity (sales per employee) 
 log (wage) log(productivity) 
 Full sample Overlap sample Full sample 
Overlap 
sample 
Starter 0.119 (2.93) 0.084 (1.58) 0.251 (3.24) 0.151 (1.82) 
(t = 2)*Starter 0.003 (0.06) 0.010 (0.15) 0.049 (0.50) 0.086 (0.82) 
(t = 3)*Starter 0.027 (0.52) 0.025 (0.39) 0.146 (1.41) 0.120 (1.14) 
(t = 4)*Starter -0.038 (0.69) -0.066 (0.88) 0.161 (1.57) 0.140 (1.32) 
Size (employees)     
50-249 
employees 0.157 (7.21) 0.142 (4.68) 0.244 (6.08) -0.089 (1.94) 
More than 
249 
employees 
0.260 (7.51) 0.083 (1.63) 0.223 (2.91) -0.408 (3.93) 
Percentage of 
college graduates 
and engineers 
0.010 (7.05) 0.009 (4.74) 0.010 (5.42) 0.0002 (0.09) 
Exporter 0.082 (6.37) 0.020 (0.81) 0.384 (13.91) -0.034 (0.86) 
Age/10 0.035 (9.65) 0.044 (4.95) 0.015 (2.65) 0.038 (3.04) 
R2 0.403 0.483 0.346 0.553 
Observations 2480 599 2481 599 
Firms 661 429 661 429 
Wages and sales are deflated by the aggregate consumer price index.  Only observations of years where 
information about percentage of college graduates and engineers is updated are included: 1990, 1994, 
1998, 2002, 2006 and 2010. All estimated equations (OLS) include a constant and dummies for 
industries, years and periods t. |t|-statistics in brackets. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedascity 
and for the clustered sampling scheme 
 
 
